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According to Keith Ward, “One must…reject those crude accounts of Christian doctrine
which…say that Christ has been justly punished in our place so that he has taken away our guilt
and enabled God to forgive us. Almost everything is ethically wrong about these accounts.”1
This statement is just one instance of a commonly occurring dismissal of the penal substitution
theory of the atonement.2 For various reasons, many today find the theory morally (and
theologically and exegetically) untenable.3 Some, such as Gregory Boyd and Eleonore Stump,
formulate moral objections to penal substitution based on beliefs about the concept of
forgiveness.4 In this paper it will be argued that Boyd and Stump’s objections to the moral
plausibility of the penal substitution theory of the atonement that involve the concept of
forgiveness are unsuccessful. In so doing, a brief outline of the penal substitution theory will be
given, some relevant starting assumptions will be discussed, Boyd and Stump’s objections will
be explained, the concept of forgiveness will be explored and analyzed, and a response will be
made to Boyd and Stump utilizing the previously developed construal of forgiveness.

Penal Substitution
In brief, “the atonement” in Christian theology is “the saving work of Jesus Christ.”5
There are a diversity of theories that have been propounded as explanations of what exactly the

1. Keith Ward, Ethics and Christianity, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 240.
2. Steven L. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and
Philosophy 21, no. 2 (Apr. 1, 2004): 228-9.
3. See, for example, Paul R. Eddy and James Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of
the Atonement, eds. James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 9-10; Thomas
R. Schreiner, “Penal Substitution View,” in The Nature of the Atonement, eds. James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 70-1.
4. See discussion below.
5. Eddy and Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 9.
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saving work of Christ was (or, perhaps more precisely, what the central component of His work
was).6 The penal substitution theory began to be developed by John Calvin (1509-64), gaining
ground as a prominent theory in Christian thinking in his wake.7 Thomas Schreiner explains it as
follows:
The penalty for sin is death…Sinners deserve eternal punishment in hell from God
himself because of their sin and guilt. God’s holy anger is directed…against all those
who have sinned…yet because of God’s great love, he sent Christ to bear the punishment
of our sins. Christ died in our place, took to himself our sin…and guilt…, and bore our
penalty so that we might receive forgiveness of sins.8
Though various versions of the theory have been developed,9 this explication by
Schreiner captures two crucial points that shape the penal substitution approach to the atonement.
These are: 1) that in His death on the cross Christ (voluntarily!) “bore our penalty,” which we
deserve from God because of our sin,10 and 2) that He did so in order that we “might receive
forgiveness of sins” and the propitiation of God’s wrath toward us.11 These two components of
penal substitution are what occasion the objections that will be considered here. When the term
“penal substitution” is used during the course of the rest of this paper it will denote these two
claims about Christ’s atoning work.
6. See Eddy and Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 10-20;
Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2011), 501-9.
7. Eddy and Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 16-7.
8. Schreiner, “Penal Substitution View,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 72-3.
9. Eddy and Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 17; Steven L.
Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with Christianity’s
Critics: Answering New Atheists & Other Objectors, eds. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig (Nashville, TN: B&H
Publishing Group, 2009), 237.
10. See also Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending
with Christianity’s Critics, 237.
11. Eddy and Beilby, “The Atonement: An Introduction,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 16.
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Background Assumptions
Now, before getting to the issues to be tackled here, it will be helpful to make explicit
some important assumptions that will be lying in the background of the discussion. These
assumptions will not be extensively argued, for they are not the focus of the present paper, but
the arguments to follow will depend on them in various, important ways. The first of these
assumptions is a rejection of divine impassibility, the second is a rejection of divine simplicity,
the third is a rejection of divine timelessness, the fourth is a weak view of divine immutability,
and the fifth is a form of divine command theory. These will now be briefly commented on in
turn.
To reject divine impassibility is to reject that God “never suffers pain or is changed in
attitude, emotion, or behavior by causes external to [God].”12 Most importantly for this paper, it
is to claim that that which is external to God can cause, or be the occasion of, changes in God’s
emotions. As Stephen Davis points out, Scripture seems to portray God as interacting with and
responding to human agents.13 Moreover, God’s emotions seem to be involved in God’s
interactions with humans.
Similarly, God seems to have distinct, non-identical attributes, such as omnipotence and
wisdom.14 In other words, divine simplicity, the doctrine that there is absolutely no complexity in
God whatsoever,15 appears to be false. Divine timelessness also seems to be false, for, again,
12. Stephen T. Davis, “Three Conceptions of God in Contemporary Christian Philosophy?” in
Readings in the Philosophy of Religion [Second Edition], ed. Kelly James Clark (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008),
492.
13. Ibid., 494-5.
14. Ibid., 495; see also the discussion in William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations
for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 524-6.
15. Davis, “Three Conceptions of God in Contemporary Christian Philosophy?” in Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion, 492; Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 524.
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Scripture seems to portray God as genuinely interacting with human agents in various ways in
dynamic time, apparently implying a “before and after in God’s life”16 and thus both divine
temporal location and extension.17 These first three assumptions pave the way for, and seem to
entail, a weak view of divine immutability.18
A strong view of divine immutability holds that there is not any change in God, whether
intrinsic (a change of non-relational properties) or extrinsic (a change in relational properties).19
If, however, one holds, as is being assumed here, that God really interacts with humans in
dynamic time, having various emotional responses to what they do and otherwise being variously
related to them at different times, then such a strong construal of divine immutability seems ruled
out. Thus, a weakening of the doctrine is in order. One plausible weak view, seemingly more in
line with the Scriptural depiction of God, is as follows: “God is…constant and unchangeable in
his character…[and] is immutable in…existence (necessity, aseity, eternity) and…being
omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent.”20 This is the view that will be assumed in this paper.
Moreover, it will be taken for granted in what follows that God is the metaphysical
foundation for morality. God’s nature is the paradigm and standard of moral goodness. Thus, on
this picture, to say that God is good is to assent to his essential and maximal possession of the
moral virtues. Furthermore, God’s commands constitute the moral duties binding on human
persons. These commands are not arbitrary, but flow from God’s nature. Such a version of divine
16. Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 512.
17. Davis, “Three Conceptions of God in Contemporary Christian Philosophy?” in Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion, 492-5; see also the discussion in Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a
Christian Worldview, 511-5, where the relevance of one’s view of time for assessing this doctrine is noted.
18. Consider this discussion in Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview,
526-7.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 527.
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command theory, nestled between the horns of the euthyphro dilemma, seems to be both
theologically and philosophically plausible.21

Penal Substitution and Divine Forgiveness: Some Alleged Problems

Objection 1: There is No Divine Forgiveness in Penal Substitution
With these five assumptions in place, it is time to consider the objections of Boyd and
Stump to penal substitution that are to be tackled. In reference to what she takes to be the popular
understanding of the atonement, which is something like the penal substitution view, Stump
claims that it does not really involve divine forgiveness.22 According to her, “To forgive a debtor
is to fail to exact all that is in justice due.”23 In the background of this understanding of
forgiveness seems to be the idea that when one is wronged by another, the wrongdoer incurs a
sort of moral “debt” to the victim, an obligation to apologize to the victim, to “make it up” to the
victim or to do some other such thing. This is not an implausible thought.24 Given it, Stump
seems to take forgiveness as a sort of “lifting” of this obligation from the wrongdoer by the
victim, at least in a sense. When a victim forgives a wrongdoer, Stump apparently thinks, the

21. For a further explication of this view, see Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a
Christian Worldview, 529-32. Again, this theory is a theory of moral ontology, not moral epistemology or moral
semantics. It splits the horns of the euthyphro dilemma in that on it God’s commands are not arbitrary, nor is the
metaphysical foundation of morality something independent of God.
22. Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 427-8. See also Eleonore Stump,
“Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 61-2.
23. Stump, Aquinas, 428. See also Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the
Christian Faith, 62.
24. Nor is such a thought idiosyncratic. Richard Swinburne, for example, holds to something along these
lines. See Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 229-30.
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victim fails (presumably intentionally) to forcibly obtain from the wrongdoer what the
wrongdoer “owes” the victim.
Now, as Stump see it, on the penal substitution account “…God does exact every bit of
the debt owed him by human beings…,” even if the debt is not exacted from the party that
incurred it.25 Given that the debt is exacted, the one to whom it was owed has not “foregone” one
bit of what was owed and thus cannot be said to have forgiven in any sense.26 Boyd seems to
pose essentially the same problem, though he elaborates on it even less than Stump. He asks, “If
God must always get what is coming to him in order to forgive (namely, “a kill”), does God ever
really forgive?”27

Objection 2: The Penal Substitution View Presents an Inaccurate View of God’s Character
Boyd also asks, “how is the view that God requires a kill to have his rage placated
essentially different from the pagan or magical understanding of divine appeasement found in
primordial religions throughout history?”28 Again, regrettably, he does not elaborate on his
question. Apparently, he thinks that the penal substitution presents a primitive, inaccurate picture
of God. The idea that God requires death before God’s anger at sin is appeased and God can
forgive sin impugns the character of God. The penal substitution theory’s view of God is,
allegedly, magical, pagan and primordial, which, it is implied, is unacceptable.

25. Stump, Aquinas, 428. See also Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the
Christian Faith, 62.
26. Stump, Aquinas, 428. See also Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the
Christian Faith, 62.
27. Gregory A. Boyd, “Christus Victor Response,” in The Nature of the Atonement, eds. James
Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 104.
28. Ibid.
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Stump seems to agree with the idea that penal substitution paints an inaccurate and
unacceptable picture of God’s character, though for different reasons than Boyd. As opposed to
her view, which she says conceives of God as something like a parent who is concerned with
developing God’s children’s (God’s creatures, that is) character (which is the only reason, on her
view, for which God would punish God’s creatures), the penal substitution view, allegedly,
makes God out to be concerned with “balancing accounts.”29 It
rests on a conception of God which makes him seem something like an accountant
keeping double-column books on the universe. When a person commits a sin, a debt of
guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on the same line in the other
column by the payment of a punishment which compensates for the guilt.30
This, she apparently thinks, is bad, for it is better for God to be more concerned with the
development of the character of God’s creatures than with balancing moral accounts in this or
some similar way. Stump must also be thinking here that these two concerns are mutually
exclusive, or at least that they cannot both be pursued fully by God before, after, simultaneously
with, one before and one after, etc. forgiving in a way that is morally acceptable (otherwise it is
not clear how she could make this complaint).

Objection 3: The Penal Substitution View Paints a Picture of Divine Forgiveness that is
Inconsistent with Scripture
Finally, Boyd doubts that the penal substitution view presents a picture of God that
squares with the teaching of Scripture. He asks,
How are we to reconcile the idea that the Father needs to exact payment from or on
behalf of his enemies with Jesus’ teaching (and example) that we are to love
29. Stump, Aquinas, 436-8. See also Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the
Christian Faith, 68-9.
30. Ibid., 436. See also Stump, “Atonement According to Aquinas,” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith,
68.
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unconditionally and forgive without demanding payment?…how are we to reconcile the
idea that God cannot be reconciled with sinners without his wrath being satisfied with
blood with the pervasive scriptural depiction of God forgiving people without needing his
wrath appeased (e.g., Lk 15:11-32)?31

Summary
All three of these objections directly concern forgiveness, particularly divine forgiveness
of human sins. Collectively, they claim that a plausible and Scripturally informed account of
God’s forgiveness of sinners rules out the penal substitution theory of the atonement. So, an
adequate consideration of and response to these claims calls for some reflection on the concept
of forgiveness. That task will be taken up presently.

Forgiveness: Human and Divine32

Human Forgiveness
According to Jeffrie Murphy, forgiveness is “the overcoming, on moral grounds, of what
I will call the vindictive passions-the passions of anger, resentment, and even hatred that are
often occasioned when one has been deeply wronged by another.”33 This thought, that

31. Boyd, “Christus Victor Response,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 104.
32. Much of this section is adapted from a paper submitted to Paul Reasoner on October 17, 2014, which
was an assignment for the philosophy seminar he was instructing.
33. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 16. Many others also accept accounts along these lines. See Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair:
Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 154-5 fn3.
Robert Roberts and Charles Griswold should also be on this list. See Robert C. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 4 (Oct., 1995): 289-306; Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical
Exploration (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38-112. As Walker notes, this tradition finds its
roots in the sermons of Bishop Joseph Butler, though he did not actually hold Murphy’s view. See Sermons VIII-IX
in Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal
Library, 2006.), http://www.ccel.org/ccel/butler/sermons.html.
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forgiveness necessarily and centrally involves the rejection of the vindictive passions, seems
plausible. If one has forgiven someone who has wronged him/her, then it seems natural to
suppose that this forgiver harbors no more vindictive passions aimed at the forgiven.34 At the
very least, it seems like “completed” forgiveness would require such a state. It is plausible that
one can be said to have forgiven another yet still retain some vindictive passions, for our
passions are not directly in our control (in the case of us humans, anyway).35 That being said, if
this person has not made some sort of willful decision “against” his/her vindictive passions, a
decision to overcome them or set them aside to the highest degree possible, then, plausibly, this
person has not forgiven in any sense.36
Now, this claim that a minimum requirement of having forgiven in any sense is a willful
decision against one’s vindictive passions indicates that forgiveness is fundamentally a choice, a
choice that leads to, or at least has the intention of, a change of heart. It should be noted that in
order for such a choice to count as forgiveness, it seems to be the case that it must be made for a
morally relevant reason.37 After all, a decision to suppress the memory of a wrong done to one
via hypnosis or some similar means for the purpose of improved concentration while playing
video games does not seem like a choice to forgive, though it is a choice to overcome vindictive
passions. Likewise, as Robert Roberts notes, “Therapeutic motivations in…egoistic form seem to
be outside the spirit of forgiveness.”38 This certainly seems so.
34. Surely our forgiveness is typically, even if not necessarily, properly directed at those who have
wronged us.
35. Walker, Moral Repair, 155-6.
36. Griswold, Forgiveness, 39-43. Griswold makes essentially these points, though only in reference to the
overcoming of resentment, which he defines on page 39.
37. Margaret R. Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 30, no. 4 (Oct., 1993): 341.
38. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 296.
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These points do not clarify what reasons might count as morally sufficient to motivate
forgiveness, however. Murphy and Charles Griswold, among others, argue for limiting the
possibly motivating reasons to repentance on the wrongdoer’s part. Murphy, who thinks such a
move is reasonable,39 takes a weaker position than Griswold, who thinks that the notion of
forgiveness is conceptually tied to repentance such that if there is no repentance40 (or at least the
willingness to repent) by the wrongdoer, there can be no forgiveness.41 Murphy claims that his
position can guard against “sacrificing our self-respect or our respect for the moral order-a
respect that is often evinced in resentment and other vindictive passions.”42 According to him,
“hastily forgiving” the wrongdoer may condone his or her action(s) and the degrading message
conveyed thereby. Withholding forgiveness until repentance can not only guard one against the
harm of not showing self-respect, it can also give the wrongdoer an incentive for “moral
rebirth.”43 Similarly, Griswold warns that unconditional forgiveness (from here on out referring
to forgiveness not conditioned on repentance) may (probably will, in fact) condone or encourage
wrongdoing as well as damage victims’ self-respect.44
This, however, does not seem right. First, there appear to be counterexamples to this
view. Consider, for example, the priest who preemptively forgives Jean Valjean in Les

39. Murphy, Getting Even, 35-7, 77-8.
40. See Griswold, Forgiveness, 150-1, for a summary of the conditions he thinks that wrongdoers must
meet in order to be forgivable. This author takes it that these conditions constitute repentance, or perhaps repentance
“plus some.”
41. Ibid., 115, 121-2.
42. Murphy, Getting Even, 35.
43. Ibid.
44. Griswold, Forgiveness, 63-6. On page 46 Griswold defines condoning as either “accepting while not
disapproving (by not holding the wrong-doing against its author),” or “tolerating while disapproving (a sort of “look
the other way” or “putting up with it” strategy).”
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Misérables. His action seems, at least to this author, to be both legitimate forgiveness and not
any less morally praiseworthy than an act of forgiveness done in response to repentance.
Consider also the following story, recounted by Margaret Walker during a discussion of
unforgivability:
Lawrence Weschler describes Luis Perez Aguirre, a young Jesuit priest from a
wealthy family who, during the severe repression under a military government that took
power in 1973, was repeatedly imprisoned and tortured after founding a human rights
organization in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1981. Still bearing the lines of scarred cigarette
burns on his arms, he describes twice encountering on the street the man who tortured
him: “He tried to avoid my gaze…But I took the initiative. I called him over….He told
me he is very depressed…I showed him in a practical way that I was not angry. I told him
if he needed anything to come to me. And I told him I forgave him.”45
This apparent case of genuine forgiveness not conditioned on repentance seems, again, by this
author’s lights, not only morally praiseworthy, but almost saintly.
On an autobiographical note, this author can also think of instances in his own life where
it seems to him that he genuinely and rightly forgave people despite their not repenting. Some of
these instances involved vindictive passions that took time to overcome. If the reader has had
similar experiences and intuitions about those experiences (to the effect that they constituted
cases of genuine and proper forgiveness, that is), then he/she has some motivation to reject the
claim that forgiveness should always be conditioned on repentance. Thus, some introspection
and reflection are well in order here.
In continuation of this first point of response to Murphy and Griswold, there seems to be
a variety of plausibly morally justifying grounds for forgiveness that would apply to various
circumstances. Repentance on the wrongdoer’s part certainly seems like one such motivation to
forgive, at least in some situations. Among other reasons for this claim, repentance is a sort of

45. Walker, Moral Repair, 175.
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“self-separation” from the wrong the wrongdoer has done.46 However, it does not seem like the
only possible sufficient reason in any and all circumstances. Other sufficient reasons may be a
divine command to forgive regardless of repentance on the wrongdoer’s part47 (which, this
author assumes, even theists who are not divine command theorists would give moral weight to),
the fact that forgiveness can help realize various goods in the wake of wrongdoing (such as peace
and the avoidance of cycles of revenge),48 the fact that at least some forgiveness independent of
repentance is necessary for the thriving, or perhaps even the possibility, of valuable close
relationships, and the fact that unconditional forgiveness may motivate moral reform in the
wrongdoer (as it apparently did with Jean Valjean). This list is not offered as exhaustive, but
simply as a selection of facts that, if true, can plausibly legitimately motivate a decision to
forgive.
Moreover, it is not obvious that unconditional forgiveness sacrifices one’s self-respect or
respect for the moral order. It seems entirely possible to still conceive of oneself as having
inherent value and still conceive of the wrong done to one as really wrong despite
unconditionally forgiving. The beliefs that “I have inherent value” and “What person X did to me
was wrong” and even “I am entitled to resentment/anger towards person X for wronging me” are
not incompatible with the belief that “I forgive person X (for reason Y).” It should also be noted
that if there really are non-repentance-based morally justifying reasons to forgive, then forgiving
46. Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 346.
A point made by Joram Haber.
47. If God has so commanded. Murphy does not think so. See Murphy, Getting Even, 35-7.
48. A point made by Butler, who held that forgiveness is the forswearing of revenge and excesses of
resentment. See his Sermon IX in Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/butler/sermons.html. See also Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,”
American Philosophical Quarterly, 345, for Holmgren’s comments on the value of forgiveness from a global
perspective, as well as Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 294, for Roberts’ comments on
the kind of ethic in which the practice of forgiveness has a high value.

13

does not show disrespect for the moral order at all.49 Now, the worry may be that unconditional
forgiveness fails to express (or communicate50) respect for the moral order and/or one’s inherent
value. However, if such expression really is good, or perhaps even required, then in at least some
circumstances these beliefs can seemingly be appropriately expressed in other ways than holding
appropriate vindictiveness until repentance. These other ways may be, for example, deep sadness
over what was done, verbal repudiation that are not acts of revenge or, again, unconditional
forgiveness if non-repentance-based reasons to forgive obtain and are morally sufficient.
In addition, Murphy himself outlines how a Christian worldview can furnish one with a
conceptual framework that can guard against a loss of self-respect and respect for the moral
order while unconditionally forgiving, thus, for Christians, diminishing Griswold and his own
worries.51 To touch on just a couple of the relevant points in his discussion, consider first that on
the Christian view God will see to it that the moral calculus of the universe is not ultimately out
of balance. This, as Murphy says, can help one to “relax a bit the clinch-fisted anger and
resentment with which [one tries] to sustain [one’s] self-respect and hold [one’s] world together
all alone.”52 Second, consider the Christian claims that we are all loved by God and that we are
all created with inherent value as God’s image-bearers. A firm commitment to these claims can
shore up one’s self-respect regardless of what is done to one.53

49. In fact, unconditional forgiveness may, under some circumstances, even be morally obligatory.
Holmgren contends that this is the case. See Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American
Philosophical Quarterly, 350-1.
50. Ibid., 347-8.
51. See Murphy, Getting Even, 87-93, for the entirety of his quite compelling discussion. Interestingly, he
does not end up explicitly endorsing unconditional forgiveness as a general procedure.
52. Ibid., 92.
53. Ibid., 91-92. All this being said, the forgiver, whether forgiving conditionally or unconditionally, may
need to take certain steps before being able to forgive while retaining self-respect and respect for the moral order.
See Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 342-5, for a
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It is also not obvious that unconditional forgiveness risks, or at least necessarily risks,
condoning or encouraging wrongs. After all, the claim that “You did something wrong and
inexcusable to me” seems implicit in the assertion that “I forgive you.” If the wrong in view
were excusable, then it would be excused, not forgiven. As Murphy points out, excusing, unlike
forgiveness, is a response to non-culpable wrongdoing. Forgiveness, on the other hand, responds
to culpable wrongdoing.54 This distinction seems right. So, to communicate to someone that they
have been forgiven is necessarily to communicate to that person that they did, or are believed to
have done, something wrong and are culpable for it (to the extent that it is communicated to them
that they are forgiven). This seems inconsistent with condoning or encouraging wrongs. 55
Moreover, in at least some circumstances there may be ways to discourage wrongdoing
that are not inconsistent with unconditional forgiveness of the perpetrators of those wrongs.
Verbal repudiation seems to be one potential possibility. Setting an example of virtuous character
in the relevant ways may be another. Shunning reconciliation when so shunning is appropriate
and desirable would seem to be yet another in certain situations, such as when responding to a
perpetually adulterous spouse, perhaps. Even the act of forgiveness itself may so move the
unrepentant wrongdoer as to encourage or bring about moral reform. This list is likely not
exhaustive.56
All that being said, if unconditional forgiveness does risk condoning or encouraging

suggestion of what such steps may be.
54. Murphy, Getting Even, 13. Trudy Govier also notes this. See Trudy Govier, “Forgiveness and the
Unforgivable,” American Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 59-60.
55. If forgiveness is a response to culpable wrongdoing, and if it is also an overcoming of vindictive
passions, then it must be possible for one to judge that one has been wronged without having vindictive passions
directed at the wrongdoer. One example of a theory of emotions that allows for this is Roberts’. See Roberts,
“Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 289-293, 302-303.
56. Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 347-8.
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wrongs, it is not clear that it is to be faulted on that account. The pursuit or attainment of some
goods often comes at the expense of the attainment or realization of other goods. For example, to
choose to become a surgeon may be to forfeit becoming a pastor (presuming that both are viable
options). Similarly, spending more time with family entails spending less time with friends
(presuming that spending time with friends is often how one spends one’s free time). So, even if
unconditionally forgiving in some circumstances entails risking being understood as condoning
and/or encouraging wrongs, it still may, at least some of the time, be the case that the good(s)
attained or realized by having forgiven outweigh(s) the good of not risking being misunderstood.
Now, some argue for always conditioning forgiveness on repentance on the grounds that
doing otherwise fails to show respect for the wrongdoer “as a moral agent.”57 This claim,
however, seems badly mistaken. As Margaret Holmgren points out, taking such a position rests
on accepting two premises. One is that respecting wrongdoers entails that they should be treated
as responsible agents. The second is that “retributive hatred” is the appropriate emotional
response to responsible wrongdoers who have not repented.58 This second premise seems to rest
on a denial that there can be morally justifying reasons for forgiveness in the absence of
repentance. So, if one thinks that there can be, as has been suggested here, then there is no reason
to accept this premise. The argument is thus unconvincing.
At this point in this analysis, it appears that forgiveness is something like a willful
decision, on the basis of one or more of many possible morally relevant reasons that may obtain
in various circumstances, against one’s vindictive passions that pertain to a certain wrong (or,
perhaps, set of wrongs) done to one by a particular person or group (though perhaps there is

57. Ibid., 348.
58. Ibid.
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more to it than this).59 Whether or not one still has vindictive passions, as long as one has made
such a choice it seems right to say that said person has forgiven, even if in an incomplete sense.
Once the relevant vindictive passions have been overcome, forgiveness becomes complete. Thus,
in cases where completion takes time, forgiveness is both a choice and a process.60
It is worth considering here whether or not this conception of forgiveness can
accommodate apparently authentic instances of forgiveness that do not involve the overcoming
of vindictive passions. Consider the following example, suggested by Roberts:
A graduate-school colleague of twenty years ago phones you out of the blue and asks
forgiveness for once enviously slandering you in front of some other students and a
professor. Nothing came of the slander and you were unaware of it until now; knowing of
it, you are emotionally indifferent. Your forgiveness in this case is not much of a
psychological process at all, but simply the act of saying “I forgive you.”61
In response to this suggestion, probably the first thing worth noting is that cases of this
nature are not, or at least do not seem to be, standard cases of forgiveness. Beyond this point, one
might be tempted to say that in cases of this sort the one forgiving is really expressing a
counterfactual judgment. That is, such an act of forgiveness could be construed as the assertion
that in all of the nearest possible worlds in which the forgiver has vindictive passions directed at
the wrongdoer over the wrong in question, the forgiver chooses to overcome those passions for a

59. It should be explicitly noted here that it has not been argued that forgiveness should never be
conditioned on repentance. Rather, only a case for the claim that forgiveness need not necessarily be conditioned on
repentance in all circumstances, and can be properly motivated by other reasons in some circumstances, has been
made. This view can even be held by one who, following a line of thought suggested by Paul Reasoner and Charles
Taliaferro, agrees that the obtaining of forgiveness on the victim’s part and the obtaining of repentance on the
wrongdoer’s part is a better state of affairs than merely the obtaining of forgiveness on the victim’s part, even
though the latter state of affairs is still a good state of affairs. See Paul Reasoner and Charles Taliaferro, “The
Double Movement Model of Forgiveness in Buddhist and Christian Rituals,” European Journal For Philosophy Of
Religion: Journal Of The Central European Society For Philosophy Of Religion 1, no. 1 (Mar. 1, 2009): 28-9.
60. Holmgren disagrees with this distinction between complete and incomplete forgiveness. She would
only count what is being called “completed forgiveness” here as forgiveness. See Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the
Intrinsic Value of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 351 fn6. This distinction is not vital for the
arguments made throughout the rest of this paper, but this author, at least, finds it plausible.
61. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 304-5 fn8.
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morally justifying reason. On the one hand, assuming that we know ourselves fairly well, this
might seem like a reasonable judgment. On the other hand, given the realities of self-deception,
construing some acts of forgiveness in this manner runs the risk that the forgiver’s claim to
forgive is really an assertion of a false counterfactual. An account that allows for this possibility
is surely an implausible account.
Perhaps the best way to account for these instances of forgiveness is Roberts’ own
approach. On his view, in these uncharacteristic cases of forgiveness the one requesting
forgiveness is either angry at him/herself or convinced that the one wronged would be justified in
being angry, and the one forgiving is communicating to the one requesting forgiveness that
he/she is not inclined to anger over the matter. So, Roberts claims, in view of these
considerations these nonstandard cases of forgiveness do not undermine the centrality of the
notion of “overcoming vindictive passions” (or, on his view, just anger) in the concept of
forgiveness.62 These points seem plausible.
All this being said, it is still an open question whether or not the definition of forgiveness
that has been given here encompasses all that forgiveness is. During the course of Murphy’s
discussion of his conception of forgiveness, he suggests a broadening of the concept to include
the overcoming of “a variety of negative feelings that one might have towards a wrongdoerresentment, yes, but also such feelings as anger, hatred, loathing, contempt, indifference,
disappointment, or even sadness.”63 However, to conceive of the act of forgiveness as responding
to all of these feelings in light of a wrong done to one seems to be a stretch. As Griswold point
out, it is consistent to say that A has forgiven B but still has, for example, sadness over what B

62. Ibid.
63. Murphy, Getting Even, 59. Jeffrey Blustein agrees. See Jeffrey Blustein, “Forgiveness,
Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions,” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 4 (Jul., 2010):
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has done or is still disappointed with B.64 On the other hand, as noted above, it does not make
sense to say that A has forgiven B but still has unaltered and persisting vindictive passions
directed at B for the wrong done. If this is right, and it seems so, then the feelings which the act
of forgiveness directly and primarily addresses are plausibly only the vindictive passions. It may
be that negative feelings other than the vindictive passions are overcome as a component of some
acts of forgiveness, or perhaps as a byproduct of or in correlation with some acts of forgiveness,
but the point remains that forgiveness is not primarily concerned with the overcoming of these
feelings.
The 18th century bishop Joseph Butler thought that in addition to the overcoming of
excessive vindictive passions, (he thought that one could forgive and still retain appropriate
vindictiveness) forgiveness includes the decision to not carry out revenge.65 This is plausible. As
Griswold notes, if person A carries out, or intends to carry out, revenge on person B for a wrong
done by B to A, A has not forgiven B.66 It seems, however, that the decision by the forgiver not to
carry out revenge can be reasonably thought to be a component of, or entailed by, the notion of a
“willful decision against one’s vindictive passions.”67 Since it has already been suggested that
this notion lies at the heart of the concept of forgiveness, that “A decides to not carry out revenge
on B” need not be explicitly mentioned as a condition of A forgiving B.

591-7. Both Murphy and Blustein follow Norvin Richards’ lead here.
64. Griswold, Forgiveness, 41.
65. Sermon IX in Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/butler/sermons.html. See also the discussion in Griswold, Forgiveness, 19-37.
66. Griswold, Forgiveness, 38-9.
67. Assuming Murphy’s definition of revenge as “the infliction of suffering on a person in order to satisfy
vindictive emotions or passions.” See Murphy, Getting Even, 17. This seems plausible, or at least the connection
between revenge and the satisfaction of vindictive passions seems right. Whether or not suffering is inflicted, there
is at least some sort of personally carried out retaliation involved in revenge.
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Though this point brings out the fact that forgiveness has consequences for the forgiver’s
relations with others (that is, it entails, at least, not treating people in certain ways), it seems that
forgiveness should not be construed in a way that is too strongly relational. Forgiveness should
not be confused with reconciliation. We may, apparently rightly, follow Roberts’ lead and say
that forgiveness, which follows breaches in relationships, generally aims at reconciliation,68
whatever the morally justifying reasons for engaging in the act are. However, it seems that
forgiveness can obtain in instances where reconciliation does not, and perhaps even should not,
obtain. Murphy provides a nice example of such a case:
Imagine a battered woman who has been repeatedly beaten and raped by her
husband or boyfriend. This woman-after a religious conversion, perhaps-might well come
to forgive her batterer (i.e., stop hating him) without a willingness to resume her
relationship with him. “I forgive you and wish you well” can, in my view, sit quite
consistently with “I never want you in this house again.” In short, the fact that one has
forgiven does not mean that one must also trust or live again with a person.69
This seems eminently plausible.70 Thus the impetus to not construe forgiveness primarily in
relational terms, but rather, primarily, in terms of a change of heart.
So, given the lines of thought in this section taken together, it seems that, indeed,
forgiveness is a willful decision, on the basis of one or more of many possible morally relevant
reasons that may obtain in various circumstances, against one’s vindictive passions that pertain
to a certain wrong (or, perhaps, set of wrongs) done to one by a particular person or group. At
least this would appear to be the case in human instances of forgiveness. The question of whether
or not this conception of forgiveness is an accurate understanding of divine forgiveness remains.

68. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 293-4.
69. Murphy, Getting Even, 14-15. On pages 15-16 he also claims that reconciliation may obtain without
forgiveness. Cf. Walker, Moral Repair, 156.
70. Holmgren agrees, citing a similar case. See Holmgren, “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of
Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 342. Roberts also seems to take such a position. See Roberts,
“Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 293-4.
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Before answering this question, however, some reflection on theological methodology will be
useful.

An Approach to Conceiving of Divine Forgiveness
Let us assume that God created us with the ability to know God, or at least something
about God, and, correspondingly, with the ability to discourse meaningfully about God. The
concept of divine revelation, that is, of God making Godself know to humans, seems to take as
much for granted. If this is the case, then, when either doing theology or discoursing about God
in general, it seems appropriate to assume that our concepts can accurately apply to God unless
we have reason to think otherwise. These reasons can, presumably, come in two sorts. One
would be some reason(s) to think that our concept in question is deficient. The other would be
some reason(s) to think that our concept in question cannot apply to God, either fully or at all,
based on other things we know about God.71
Taking this approach with respect to the concept of forgiveness, let us start with the
assumption that forgiveness for God is the same as forgiveness for humans and consider whether
or not there are reasons to abandon this starting position. Assuming that the above argumentation
establishes the appropriate concept of forgiveness, the most plausible way to question this initial
position is, it would seem, by questioning whether or not it is appropriate to think that God has,
or can have, vindictive passions. Recall that the definition of “vindictive passions” operative here
is “the passions of anger, resentment, and even hatred that are often occasioned when one has
been deeply wronged by another.”72 For the purposes of this paper, the question will be narrowed

71. For an incisive response to Kantian, as well as some “Kantianesque,” objections to the notion that our
concepts apply to God, see Alvin Plantina, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press), 3-63.
72. Murphy, Getting Even, 16.
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to whether or not it is appropriate for God to be angry in response to being wronged by others.
Roberts objects to ascribing resentment to God on the grounds that, as he sees it, it is a passion
had by those who, to a degree, conceive of themselves as powerless to exact revenge on those
who have wronged them.73 The question of whether or not God can hate seems, at least prima
facie, more controversial that the question of whether or not God can be angry. Nothing in this
paper rests on taking a definitive stance on these issues, so they can be set aside and not debated
here.

Problems with this Construal?
Now, one might object to the idea of God being angry in response to being wronged by
others in a number of ways. For instance, one might think that the notion of God being angry at
all is problematic. Given that the concern in this paper is God forgiving human sin, one may also
object to the notion of God being angry at human wrongdoing.74 However, these notions seem on
their faces to be coherent and generally unproblematic. In short, God may be (in fact, probably
is) morally repulsed by sin, and anger is a common, seemingly appropriate form of moral
73. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 291. Anne Minas also objects to
ascribing resentment, on a certain construal, to God, though for other reasons. See Anne C. Minas “God and
Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly 25 (Apr. 1975): 145-7.
74. As Joel Green and Steve Chalke do. See Joel B. Green, “Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal
Substitutionary Terms?” Questions, Caveats and a Plea,” in The Atonement Debate: Papers From the London
Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, eds. Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids,
MI: Zondervan, 2008.), 159-64; Steve Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” in The Atonement Debate: Papers
From the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, eds. Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008), 39-42. Their claims here are based primarily on exegetical grounds. For
some analyses of the biblical texts that yields a contrary conclusion, that is, that God is indeed angry at human
wrongdoing, see I. Howard Marshall, “The Theology of the Atonement,” in The Atonement Debate: Papers From
the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, eds. Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008.), 50-5; Richard Gaffin, “Atonement in the Pauline Corpus,” in The Glory of
the Atonement: Biblical, Historical and Practical Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Roger Nicole, eds. Charles E.
Hill and Frank A. James III (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 150-6. See also the comments on God’s
wrath in L.J. Kreitzer, “Eschatology,” in Dictionary of Paul and His Letters, eds. Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P.
Martin, and Daniel G. Reid (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 262.
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reaction to wrongdoing (sin) in at least some circumstances. All things being equal, in at least
some cases in which we are wronged by others the appropriateness of anger as a moral reaction
is intuitive. If our wrongdoing is directed at God, then it is not clear why God would not properly
be angry at us in response. It is, after all, a serious matter to wrong God, the first and most
valuable being in the universe, who has graciously granted us existence.
Even when wrongdoing is not directed against us, anger as a moral reaction to
wrongdoing does not always seem out of place in virtuous persons. Consider, for example, the
moral outrage that many have at the actions of serial rapists whom they have never personally
come into contact with. This outrage seems quite appropriate. So, even if we humans do not
wrong God, God may still be appropriately angry at the wrongs we perpetrate against others.
That being said, the concept of forgiveness argued for here involves an overcoming of
anger over wrongs done against the one forgiving. Some may be inclined to think that the notion
of “wronging God” is incoherent, for, plausibly, God qua God (setting aside relevant issues
surrounding the incarnation) cannot be harmed or injured.75 While this suggestion that God
cannot be harmed or injured may be true, though one who, say, thinks that God genuinely
grieves over the damage done by human wrongdoing may construe God’s emotional distress as a
sort of harm, it need not be debated here. For, there seems to be a sense, at least on the moral
ontology assumed in this paper, in which our wrongdoing is directed at God, even if not in a way
that harms or injures God. On this view (this form of divine command theory, that is), our moral
obligations are constituted by God’s commands. So, a refusal to live up to one’s moral
obligations seems to be a refusal to submit to God’s authority, rightfully had in virtue of, at least,

75. See Minas “God and Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly, 148-9.
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being the metaphysical ground of moral goodness (not to mention everything else76). So, then, to
do wrong by violating one’s moral obligations is, as a refusal to submit to God’s rightful
authority, directed at God in at least this way.
Human failure to be virtuous can also plausibly be construed as human moral
wrongdoing directed, in a sense, at God. According to Steven Porter, God has given us “the
highest good bar none,” that is, “the opportunity for loving relationship with himself.”77
Furthermore, he suggests that we understand “life in friendship with God to be inexorably linked
to the virtuous life.”78 So, to fail at being virtuous is thus to reject God, to push God out of one’s
life.79 This seems right. Plausibly, God, being perfectly good, cannot, all things being equal,
tolerate being in a life of friendship with vicious people.
These claims that all wrongdoing is, in some sense, directed at God allay worries that
God cannot forgive, either rightfully or in any sense, all sin.80 Instances in which Jones’ brother
forgives him for capriciously punching his classmate are not analogous to instances in which
God forgives Jones for capriciously punching his classmate. In the first case, Jones did not
wrong his brother (or so let us stipulate), but in the second case Jones’ wrong was, in a sense,
directed at God as well as at his classmate. In this latter case, then, at least two people can
rightfully forgive Jones, that is, God and his classmate, and Jones should probably seek
forgiveness from both. In the former case, Jones’ brother plausibly cannot forgive him for what

76. Consider the first point made by Murphy in Murphy, Getting Even, 91.
77. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and
Philosophy, 235.
78. Ibid., 240 fn35.
79. Ibid.
80. See, for example, John Gingell, “Forgiveness and Power,” Analysis 34, no. 6 (Jun., 1974): 180-3; Minas
“God and Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly, 148-9.
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he has done.
Interesting epistemic issues do arise here, however. As Porter notes, some may point out
that those who are ignorant of wrongdoing in general being in any sense directed at God cannot
be culpable for wronging God.81 This may be true in some cases, though, as Porter also notes, the
persons who are in this position must be nonculpably ignorant.82 However, sorting the levels and
forms of particular individuals’ culpability in wrongdoing is probably an issue best left in the
hands of God. It seems likely that everyone who has some sense of a transcendent moral order,
that is, one not just created by humans, that has a claim on their lives, which, this author would
wager, is most of us, and does not live up to the requirements of that order is culpable before
God for wronging God (from here on out, when God is said to be “wronged” it should be
understood in one and/or the other sense described above). In any case, it does not follow from
the fact that there may be those who nonculpably wrong God that God is unjustified in being
angry at at least some human wrongdoing, all ultimately directed against God.
Returning to the broader question of whether the conception of forgiveness outlined
above is an accurate picture of divine forgiveness, it should be noted that this understanding of
forgiveness fits readily with the collection of assumptions about God’s nature made explicit
above, namely that God is not simple, impassible, timeless or strongly immutable. The picture of
God these assumptions paint makes God out to be able to have dynamic interactions, including
emotional interactions, with human beings over time. On this picture, God’s emotions can be
occasioned in various different ways at different times by the actions of humans. Thus, at one
time God can be angry at person X for wrong Y, and at a later time God can forgive (i.e., cease to

81. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and
Philosophy, 240 fn35.
82. Ibid.
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be angry at) X for reason Z.
Anne Minas, however, objects to this sort of picture. According to her, given God’s
omnipercipience, that is, his perception of everything, God always fully perceives all situations
at all times. Moreover, “In perceiving situations, he knows them in a way in which they are fully
real to him, meaning that he reacts…with all appropriate feelings. Then, to be omnipercipient is
to have all reactions to all situations equally vivid, regardless of when they happen.”83 Thus,
even if God is in time, a “dimming of feeling” is impossible on God’s part.84 So, God cannot
literally overcome anger, that is, forgive.
Omnipercipience, however, is not one of the attributes typically predicated of God.
Perhaps Minas takes it that this attribute is somehow implied by divine omniscience, or perhaps
divine timelessness. If the latter, then this objection need not be considered any further given the
assumption of divine temporality taken here. Moreover, since Minas thinks that her objection
applies even if God is in time, she probably does not think this. If the former, then this objection
may have some weight. However, granting, for the sake of argument, that God perceives things
in some sense, it is not at all clear that God, being in time, can perceive all situations in God’s
life “equally vividly.” Presumably, God’s omniscience entails perfect memory, including
memories of what emotions God felt in times past, and perfect prescience, including beliefs
about what emotions God will feel at future times, but, since God is in time, some argument
against the prima facie plausible position that God only perceives what is presently occurring
seems in order. Given presentism, there is literally no future or past to perceive, and it seems that

83. Minas “God and Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly 25 (Apr. 1975): 145. Presumably, Minas is
referring to situations in the actual world in this quote.
84. Ibid.
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the A-Theory of time, married with presentism, is the prima facie default position on time.85
Thus, if omnipercipience is to be claimed to be an attribute of God that makes his overcoming of
anger impossible, then more argumentation is needed in order to justify the claim that God is
indeed omnipercipient.
If God only perceives what is presently occurring, then his emotions are plausibly
primarily occasioned by what is happening now. They will certainly be conditioned by what God
remembers and foreknows, such that, for example, God may be angry at Sally for presently being
in the state of having sinned, a perception that is conditioned by God’s memory. Furthermore,
even though God may have joy over the foreknown fact that there will eventually be a justifying
reason to forgive Sally (in this hypothetical scenario one will obtain, though it has not done so
yet), God will not yet overcome God’s anger at her, or so it would seem. Plausibly, God would
not overcome God’s anger at Sally until the morally justifying reason for doing so obtained. So,
despite God’s omniscience, and in the absence of some reason to accept the doctrine of divine
omnipercipience, God can, seemingly, be angry at someone for wronging God at one time and
overcome it at a later time for some justifying reason.

Divine Forgiveness: Conclusion
So, then, forgiveness for God appears to be the same, or roughly the same, as forgiveness
for human beings. When God forgives, God overcomes God’s anger at particular persons or
groups for a wrong or set of wrongs that they have perpetrated against God, and God does so for

85. See the discussion in Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 379389. This author takes the A-Theory of time to be the prima facie default position on time because of our universal
experience of temporal becoming, as do Craig and Moreland. Moreover, this author takes presentism to be the prima
facie default position on the existence of temporal entities because of how counterintuitive the notion is that we are
4-dimensional space-time worms. We seem to have, or at least this author has, the intuition that “All of me (not just
a temporal slice of the totality of me, like a slice of a loaf of bread) is present.”

27

some morally justifying reason or other, depending on the context. This conclusion is grounded
in the claim that we should understand our concepts as applying to God as they are unless we
have some reason to think otherwise, and, in this case, no such reason has so far been
forthcoming. With this in mind, Stump and Boyd’s objections to the penal substitution theory of
the atonement will now be assessed.

Penal Substitution Revisited

Objection 1 Considered
Recall, first, the objection that if God “exacts” the debt God is owed by those who have
wronged God prior to, after, or simultaneously with “forgiving” them, either from the offending
party or by a substitute, then God does not really forgive. Again, to forgive, says Stump, is “to
fail to exact all that is in justice due” from those who are in moral debt to their victims in virtue
of wronging them.86 As we have seen, however, this is not what forgiveness is.87 To repeat,
forgiveness, in short, is the overcoming of vindictive passions for a moral reason. Perhaps as a
corollary of true forgiveness the forgiver will not require the forgiven to satisfy any moral debt
he/she has toward the forgiver. However, this is not necessarily so. If Joe allows his friend Jim to
borrow his laptop, which Jim subsequently smashes to pieces with a hammer, Joe may properly
forgive Jim and, seemingly, still insist that he pay for the broken laptop (which would seem to be
Jim’s moral debt to Joe, or at least part of it, for intentionally destroying Joe’s property).
Similarly, if we have a penal debt to God in virtue of our sin (or, in other words, if we

86. Stump, Aquinas, 428. Ward makes essentially the same point. See Ward, Ethics and Christianity, 241.
87. Stump’s definition of forgiveness seems to be modeled after a conception properly pertaining to the
economic sphere. See Griswold, Forgiveness, xviii.
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deserve punishment in virtue of our sins), then, perhaps, God may justifiably forgive us and still
insist, and bring it about, that punishment for our sins be exacted, even if from a penal substitute.
Moreover, if this is so, then perhaps God may even properly consider the exaction of the
punishment we have earned from a penal substitute the morally justifying reason, or at least part
of one, to forgive us of our sins, which is precisely what the penal substation view claims.88 If
these things are so, then Stump and Boyd’s complaint that the penal substitution theory does not
actually involve God forgiving us of our sins is out of place. On the theory God justifiably
overcomes his anger towards us (i.e. forgives us) on, at least in part, the basis of Christ being our
penal substitute.
Now, the question of whether or not this basis is actually a justifying reason, or at least a
part of one, for God to forgive us remains. If the answer is “No,” then Stump and Boyd’s first
objection still goes through. If what the penal substation theory claims is God’s reason to
forgive, or at least a part of it, does not actually morally justify God’s overcoming of anger
towards us for our sin, then the theory does not actually portray God as forgiving. Forgiveness,
again, is the overcoming of anger for a morally justifying reason. Overcoming anger is not
forgiveness without such a moral dimension. However, this remaining question seems to be
answerable in the affirmative. Consider the following.
Porter has argued, as follows, that we sinners do, in fact, deserve physical and spiritual
death because of our sin, as well as that there is great moral worth in God exacting the
punishment due us from Christ in our stead. According to him, retributive punishment is
punishment that is not justified on the basis of the consequences of the punishment, but rather on
the basis of the inherent appropriateness of the punishment in virtue of the wrong it is a response

88. See above.
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to.89 More precisely, it is “the forcible withdrawal of certain rights and/or privileges from a
wrongdoer in response to the intentional misuse of those rights and/or privileges by the
wrongdoer.”90 Though retributive punishment may not be morally required as a response to
every single instance of wrongdoing,91 it at least seems morally permissible.92 For example, “if
you loan me your car and I intentionally crash it, it would seem that not only do you have the
right to demand that I pay for the damages…, but you also have the right to withhold from me
the privilege of borrowing your car again.”93 Moreover, it seems justifiable that the wife of an
unrepentant adulterous husband kick him out of the house, at least for a while. She can rightful
withdraw her husband’s “rights and privilege of family life” in response to his abuse of them,
even if she is not obligated to do so.94
Furthermore, retributive punishment is not only permissible, but good to exact in some
cases. For, it “takes the harm done with due moral seriousness,” “treats the wrongdoer as a
responsible moral agent,” “expresses the value of the victim as well as the value of the personal
relationship involved” and can give the wrongdoer an opportunity to appreciate the moral gravity
of his/her action(s).95 Passing over punishment has the potential to trivialize the harm,
89. Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with
Christianity’s Critics, 238-9 fn12. See also Jonathan Jacobs, “Luck and Retribution,” Philosophy: The Journal of the
Royal Institute of Philosophy 74, no. 190 (Oct., 1999): 535-55.
90. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 234.
91. Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with
Christianity’s Critics, 239 fn13.
92. Ibid., 238-9; Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and
Philosophy, 233-4.
93. Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with
Christianity’s Critics, 238.
94. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 234.
95. Ibid.

30

wrongdoer, victim and relationship. The avoidance of this plausibly renders retributive
punishment a good action in at least some circumstances.96
Now, we sinners have abused the rights and privileges of “earthly human life,” including
the opportunity of “eternal friendship” with God, all of which God in grace has granted us, and
so “deserve the divine punishment of physical and spiritual death.”97 Moreover, given the goods
that retributive punishment secures, there is “great moral worth” in God in exacting our due
punishment from us, for it would avoid trivializing sin, us as morally responsible agents, God
and “the divine/ human relationship.”98 However, if God undergoes punishment Godself in
Christ in our stead, then God can secure all of the goods realized by the exaction of retributive
punishment in addition to the good of showing mercy to us sinners in not requiring us to undergo
our own punishment.99
So Porter’s argument goes. His train of thought seems quite plausible. It provides a model
of retributive punishment,100 a picture of our moral standing before God and an account of the
moral worth of Christ’s substitutionary death in our place that apparently gives the penal
substitution view moral coherence. He seems correct in saying, “The goodness of [Christ’s]
96. Ibid., 234-5; Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in
Contending with Christianity’s Critics, 239-40.
97. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 235. In
other words, we deserve the removal of these rights and privileges, which we have abused.
98. Ibid. See also Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in
Contending with Christianity’s Critics, 240-2.
99. Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with
Christianity’s Critics, 242-3. See also Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,”
Faith and Philosophy, 237.
100. Though one might object to his understanding of retributive punishment, at the very least Porter offers
a model of some sort of punishment. For some alternative views of retribution, see Marshall, “The Theology of the
Atonement,” in The Atonement Debate, 56-7; Oliver D. Crisp, “The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited,” in The
Atonement Debate: Papers From the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, eds. Derek Tidball, David
Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008.), 209-212.
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punishment…is seen in that Christ’s going to the cross for our sins takes sinners and their sin
with utter seriousness and objectively reexpresses the value of the Godhead in response to the
devaluing of the Godhead expressed by human sin.”101 More to the point, however, Porter’s
argumentation seems to show that Christ’s substitutionary death on our behalf is plausibly a
morally appropriate reason for God to ground God’s overcoming of God’s anger at us for our
sins in, that is, it is a properly motivating reason for God to forgive us (at least in part-see
below). Stump and Boyd’s first objection, then, is unsuccessful. It is not the case that the penal
substitution theory does not actually involve divine forgiveness.

Objection 2 Considered
Their second objection is, essentially, that the idea that God needs “appeasement,” or to
have the moral “accounts” balanced, before forgiving impugns the character of God. However, it
is not clear that this accusation is accurate. Forgiveness just is the overcoming of vindictive
passions for a morally appropriate reason, and it has been argued that it is appropriate that God
be angry at human sin and that God overcome God’s anger towards us on the basis of Christ’s
substitutionary death in our place. If Boyd insists on describing this picture as pagan, magical
and primordial, then so be it. That is not so much an argument against penal substitution as,
seemingly, an expression of disdain towards it.
Further, contra Stump, the penal substitution view does not make God out to lack
concern for the character development of God’s creatures. On the view it is the Father, Son and
Spirit that collectively plan and carry out (in their respective roles) Christ’s work out of love for

101. Porter, “Dostoyevski, Woody Allen, and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” in Contending with
Christianity’s Critics, 243.
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the salvation of sinners.102 It is no part of this paper to claim that salvation is limited to God’s
forgiveness of sinners, predicated on Chirst’s substitutionary sacrifice.103 One of the goals of
salvation, at least as it is typically conceived of in Christian theology, is sanctification.104 The
penal substitution theory does nothing to rule this aspect of salvation out. The two concerns of
“balancing of moral accounts” and the character development of sinners do not seem to be
mutually exclusive, and Stump offers no reason to think that God cannot be concerned with both.
Stump and Boyd’s second objection, then, is also unsuccessful.

Objection 3 Considered
The third objection, which is solely Boyd’s,105 is that the penal substitution theory
portrays God in a way that is at odds with other portrayals of God in Scripture. First, the idea that
God conditions God’s forgiveness on meeting out punishment, albeit on a substitute, is, Boyd
thinks, inconsistent with God in Christ’s teaching to forgive unconditionally. Second, God is
portrayed in places in Scripture as forgiving without needing his wrath appeased, contra the
picture of God penal substitution gives. Given these apparent inconsistencies, the God of penal
substitution cannot be the God of the Bible, or so it seems to Boyd.

102. Ibid., 236; Marshall, “The Theology of the Atonement,” in The Atonement Debate, 62; Richard
Gaffin, “Atonement in the Pauline Corpus,” in The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical and Practical
Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Roger Nicole, 157-6. One might wonder whether God can simultaneously love and
be angry at us, as Chalke seems to in Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” in The Atonement Debate: Papers
From the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement, 42. There does not seem to be any reason to think that
God cannot do so, however. It is not obvious that even we humans cannot simultaneously love and be angry at
someone, but even if we cannot, some powerful argument seems to be required to think that God cannot do so. After
all, God’s cognitive capacities are far greater than ours.
103. Nor does this paper claim that the atonement is limited to its penal substitutionary aspects.
104. Horton, The Christian Faith, 648-9.
105. Though others have raised it. See, for example, Green, “Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal
Substitutionary Terms?” Questions, Caveats and a Plea,” in The Atonement Debate, 160-1.
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To take these issues out of order, the second component of this objection seems to be
confused. If forgiveness just is the overcoming of vindictive passions for a moral reason, as has
been argued, then God never forgives without having his wrath “appeased.” Though it may be
the case that God forgives in nonstandard ways at times, these instances would not undermine
the overall picture of divine forgiveness as the overcoming of anger for a moral reason being put
forward here.106 Perhaps Boyd’s objection here could be enhanced by being slightly altered to
say that there are instances in Scripture where God is portrayed as forgiving without exacting
punishment from anyone, assuming there are some, which would seem to contradict how the
penal substitution theory portrays God. This adjustment seems to give this worry more bite, but,
in the end, it does not seem to be insurmountable. For, it is open to the defender of penal
substitution to say that no one is ultimately forgiven of all sin except on the basis of Christ’s
atoning work.
Now, perhaps not everyone requires conscious knowledge of Christ’s work in order to
reap this benefit of divine forgiveness from it. Plausibly, God conditions his forgiveness of our
sin on not only Christ’s atoning work on our behalf, but also our appropriation of it. Otherwise, it
would seem that everyone would be automatically forgiven in virtue of Christ’s atonement,
which does not appear to be the vision of the New Testament. This appropriation is probably
through repentance and faith, for these are repeatedly mentioned as conditions of salvation in the
New Testament.107 However, God may forgive sinners in response to appropriate repentance and
faith, even where there is not conscious knowledge of Christ or his work.108 In other words, some

106. See the discussion of cases of forgiveness not involving the overcoming of vindictive passions above.
107. See, for example, Acts 2:14-41; 13:16-41; 16:25-34; 17:22-31; 26:9-23.
108. That being said, if this does happen, then, presumably, those whom God forgives in this way will be
expected by God to accept Christ’s substitutionary death on their behalf once they become consciously aware of it,
either in this life or the next.
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form of inclusivism may be true.109 A further exploration of this point is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it seems to be a live option that makes sense of instances in Scripture in which God
forgives and accepts those who know nothing of Christ’s atoning work, and there is no
punishment in sight.110
The first component of Boyd’s objection, that is, the worry that penal substitution makes
God out to forgive on different terms than he commands of us, seems misplaced as well. We who
know God are in the position of having been graciously forgiven much by God,111 who desires us
to be reconciled to God as well as to each other.112 As Roberts argues, this reality will prompt
gratitude to God and empathy for others in similar situations (that is, of needing forgiveness) in
those with a properly formed character, properly motivating a forgiving disposition.113 As Jesus
likewise taught in Matthew 18:23-35, though not in as much philosophical detail, only vicious
persons would not be so moved. Thus the reason, or part of it, at least, for God in Christ to
command us to forgive those who wrong us.114 As Paul instructed, “Be kind and compassionate
to one another, forgiving each other, just as in Christ God forgave you.”115
It has been argued that there is no one morally sufficient reason to forgive in all
circumstances. In God’s case, it has been argued that Christ’s substitutionary death in our place
is plausibly at least part of a morally appropriate reason for God to ground God’s forgiveness of

109. For some further discussion of inclusivism, see John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation Into
the Destiny of the Unevangelized, (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001), 215-280.
110. Assuming there are such instances. Boyd only cites a parable.
111. Col 1:13-14.
112. 2 Cor 5:14-21.
113. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 298-9.
114. Mt 18:21-22.
115. Eph 4:32 NIV
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our sins in. In our case, God’s command to forgive, motivated by, at least in part, our standing
before God as forgiven, is a properly motivating reason to forgive. So, Boyd’s third objection is
unsuccessful as well.

A Final Problem
All this being said, one might backtrack and call into question whether or not Christ’s
substitutionary death on our behalf really is, in whole or in part, a morally appropriate reason for
God to forgive human sin. After all, it has seemed to many that it is either unjust or otherwise
problematic to exact punishment from an innocent person instead of a guilty party.116 If this is so,
then God could not rightly forgive us on this basis. So, the penal substitution view still seems to
be in trouble.
In response to this worry, however, Porter seems to have another compelling case. He
makes three points. First, there is nothing logically impossible in the notion of punishing an
innocent party in place of a guilty party. Second, doing so is not unjust if the substitute is willing
and fully informed. Third, the securing of the goods which would motivate the punishment on
Porter’s view is still possible in some instances wherein a substitute takes on the punishment.117
Moreover, “the victim, within limits, has the freedom to decide to what extent and in what
manner to inflict punishment,” and there does not seem to be a reason to think that this freedom

116. See, for example, Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and
Philosophy, 236; Green, “Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal Substitutionary Terms?” Questions, Caveats
and a Plea,” in The Atonement Debate, 160-1; Crisp, “The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited,” in The Atonement
Debate, 222-223; Stump, Aquinas, 428; Ward, Ethics and Christianity, 240-241. David Lewis has argued that we
are actually double-minded on the matter. See David Lewis, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?” Philosophical
Papers 26, no. 3 (Nov. 1, 1997): 203-9.
117. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 236.
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does not include “accepting a penal substitute.”118 So, given that Christ voluntarily dies on the
cross in our place, that God considers Him so doing as taking on our due punishment119 and that,
as argued above, this action secures the goods motivating the punishment, Christ’s
substitutionary death on our behalf does not seem unjust, pointless or otherwise problematic.120
Porter appears to be on track again. Thus, this final issue does not derail the above
argumentation.

Conclusion
In conclusion, then, it seems that Boyd and Stump’s objections to the moral plausibility
of the penal substitution theory of the atonement that involve the concept of forgiveness are
unsuccessful. That is not to say that all moral objections to the theory have been dealt with,
though some related issues, such as retributive punishment, have been touched on. Nor is that to
say that penal substitution is the most exegetically or theologically plausible theory of the
atonement there is, or that it is the only dynamic to Christ’s atoning work. In regard to this last
point, and to borrow someone else’s phrase, the atonement may very well be like a diamond,
sparkling with many facets.121 All that has been argued here is that Boyd and Stump have not
shown that penal substitution is not one of those facets, at least with their particular objections
considered here.

118. Ibid.
119. Even though, perhaps, our “deservingness of punishment” is not transferred to Christ.
120. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy, 237.
121. This author has heard this phrase on the lips of more than one person, but is not sure where it
originated.
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